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False data injection attack (FDIA): 
an overview and new metrics for fair evaluation 
of its countermeasure
Mohiuddin Ahmed1 and Al‑Sakib Khan Pathan2*
Introduction and background
The Internet has a great impact on our lives. Based on similar concept of connecting 
things and objects in a virtual realm, we currently see the emergence of Internet of Eve-
rything (IoE). It has also initiated a plethora of Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs) such 
as wireless sensor networks, edge computing, smart grid and many others which can 
come together to perform some common task or could be used to attain some particular 
objective. Technically, a CAS is a system for which the entire system’s behavior cannot 
be fully understood by the full knowledge of the operations and characteristics of indi-
vidual parts in it. A CAS is often distinguished by its characteristics like self-similarity, 
self-organization, complexity, and emergence. Today, many types of complex adaptive 
systems are connected with the regular cyberspace and hence, while we are enjoying 
great level of technological advancements, we are increasingly becoming more prone to 
a wide variety of cyber attacks. Manipulation of data within an individual part in this 
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cyber setting may hamper the proper functioning of the entire CAS. Hence, confronting 
the malicious cyber activities has become one of the top priorities today. Research works 
in this field have also flourished significantly in the recent years. Among plethora of 
cyber attacks, one of the most lethal cyber attacks, False data injection attack (FDIA) has 
been chosen for discussion in this article, which may not be termed as a straight techni-
cal (i.e., that follows a set of strict rules or set of steps) attack. We present an in-depth 
analysis of this attack followed by a taxonomy of countermeasures which covers statisti-
cal and hybrid techniques. We also propose new evaluation metrics for FDIA detection 
and discuss research challenges with the datasets to validate FDIA countermeasures.
Cybersecurity has become more than a necessity in this age due to the widespread 
adoption of Internet of Everything (IoE) (Shojafar and Sookhak 2020). Today, mobile-
based anywhere anytime access to various services and critical data infrastructure could 
make the systems more vulnerable, even though there are sometimes some protection 
mechanisms (Ahamad and Pathan 2019). Figure 1 reflects current issues of the highest 
priorities in the cyberspace. All these can also be related to various types of complex 
adaptive systems.
The hackers can now launch sophisticated attacks which can have unprecedented 
consequences in our lives. The issue is no more just about specific attack today but 
often about how to deal with false information that is inputted via even legal channels. 
Today, the hackers are able to even manipulate the election results by feeding the users 
with false data, ask for ransom withholding private and sensitive data, and disrupt the 
national critical infrastructures such as smart grids and many more. In this information 
era, slight change of the truth or data value often has huge impact. Despite continuous 
funding and research projects in the cybersecurity area, neither the volume of cyber 
attacks nor the cyber criminals are showing any effective demise or reduction. The rapid 
expansion of the Internet exacerbated security of our lives although it is equally impos-
sible to deny the positive aspects of it.
The Internet and the connected devices are designed and developed often without 
considering cybersecurity as the highest priority. For instance, drones are widely used 
for hobbies and entertainment; however, we find that the manufacturers might have 
had left the digital door unlocked (i.e., without enough protection) while meeting the 
high demands (from sales perspective). From different security breach reports and our 
own study, it is evident that in the past year (2019), the number of cybercrimes has not 
Fig. 1 Current issues of the highest priorities in the cyberspace
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gone downwards anyway. The statistics is quite difficult to trace accurately due to the 
continuous and increasingly deceptive forms of attacks (in fact, some attacks are real-
ized lot later than the actual time that had happened); for example, UK businesses faced 
one cyber-attack in every 50  s according to UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019 
(2019). One key reason for this is that the skills required to become a cyber-criminal are 
easily attainable since the tools are freely available today (Ahmed et al. 2015). Figure 2 
shows the conceptual diagram of some of the ways that a hacker can get into connected 
devices. The freely available tools and the online tutorials are enough to start with hack-
ing either ethically or unethically!
After this introduction, Section “Related work, concept, and impact of FDIA” presents 
the current context of this area, the concept of FDIA and its impact on different applica-
tion domains. Section “Methods and countermeasures to defend against FDIA” presents 
the key methods for FDIA countermeasures. This section also mentions the issue of lack 
of any standard dataset in this domain. Section  “Proposed new evaluation metrics for 
FDIA countermeasures” presents our proposed evaluation metrics for fair evaluation of 
FDIA countermeasures and Section “Abberevation” concludes the paper.
Related work, concept, and impact of FDIA
While there are a wide variety of cyber attacks, on the topic of FDIA specifically, we have 
got only few survey works till this time (at the time of writing this article). Table 1 com-
pares our work with the existing ones. It is evident from the table that the existing sur-
veys are focused mainly on smart grid application domain and therefore, those only deal 
Fig. 2 Hacking made easy by tools (conceptual diagram)
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with structured data. However, our work focuses on application domains where the impact 
of FDIA will have severe consequences and at the same time, considers unstructured data 
such as images. The other works do not reflect on the evaluation aspects of FDIA counter-
measures and the metrics. Therefore, our work is distinctive than the existing ones combin-
ing important aspects of FDIA.
The classification of data is an important aspect in the context of FDIA. There are two 
broad classes of data, i.e., Structured and Unstructured (Ahmed 2019). Unstructured data 
is considered to be the information without any consistent structure and is usually unor-
ganized. Analysis of unstructured data is quite challenging and in the context of FDIA, the 
detection of such is a far-from-trivial computational task. This type of data is expected to 
be text-heavy—images are also considered to be of this type. On the other hand, structured 
data follows pre-defined data structure such as data should reside in rows and columns in a 
matrix format. Electronic heath records are considered structured data since data are con-
tained following a defined data structure, i.e., in a matrix format where each row relates to 
an individual’s information such as name, date of birth (DoB), age, weight, blood group, 
height, diabetic type, etc.
A sample case of FDIA is shown in Fig. 3. Here, it can be observed that a cyber-criminal 
is injecting false data into a data repository. For example, nowadays the healthcare records 
are stored electronically and shared among patients, doctors and other healthcare profes-
sionals. The cyber criminals can gain access unlawfully to those data repositories and inject 
false data to mislead the diagnosis and treatment procedure, i.e., if a patient’s blood group 
and diabetic type are changed, it might have a severe consequence when the patient needs 
to have blood for any medical surgery or even for prescribed medicine. In simple words, 
FDIA manipulates the real measuring vector and when that vector is observed, due to the 
presence of false data vector, the data users are being misled.
Mathematically, FDIA can be represented as in Eq. (1),
(1)False data, FD = Di,j + Fi,j
Table 1 Qualitative comparison among recent surveys
Survey data Rahman 
and Venayagamoorthy 
(2018)
Liang et al. 
(2017)
Wang et al. 
(2019)
Wang 2 et al. 
(2013)
Deng et al. 
(2017)
Our work
Structured ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Unstructured ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Survey appli‑
cation
Rahman and Venayaga‑
moorthy (2018)
Liang et al. 
(2017)
Wang et al. 
(2019)
Wang 2 et al. 
(2013)
Deng et al. 
(2017)
Our Work
Healthcare ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Finance ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Governance ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Defense ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Smart grid ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Survey evalu‑
ation
Rahman and Venayaga‑
moorthy (2018)
Liang et al. 
(2017)
Wang et al. 
(2019)
Wang 2 et al. 
(2013)
Deng et al. 
(2017)
Our work
Metrics ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Datasets ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
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where Di,j is the original dataset and Fi,j is the injected data. The amalgamation of 
injected data with original data generates the false data. Here, Fi,j can be any of the 
following:
• Deletion of data from original dataset, Di,j.
• Change of the data in the original dataset, Di,j.
• Addition of fake data to the original dataset, Di,j.
Although, the representation in Eq. (1) considers the data to be structured data (refers 
to any data that resides in a fixed field within a matrix or file (Ahmed 2019), the false 
data injection attacks can be considered for unstructured data as well [refers to informa-
tion or value that either does not have a pre-defined data model or is not organized in a 
pre-defined manner (Ahmed 2019)].
Albeit the concept of FDIA has originated from smart grid applications, it can be per-
tinent to any other Internet connected environment or a CAS, such as smart health-
care environment (Ahmed and Ullah 2018) and many others as shown in Fig. 4 (Defense, 
Finance, Governance, and so on). The FDIAs focus on data integrity/manipulation 
attacks and are significantly different from regular cyber attacks that aim to disrupt 
data availability, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (Ahmed et al. 2015). When we 
consider the healthcare and defense/military sector, human lives are directly at stake 
when FDIA is in action. Financial losses could be unbearable but when human lives are 
directly affected, we must be careful about the type of attack. Hence, it is of paramount 
importance to be aware of FDIA. A few scenarios are mentioned here to highlight the 
impacts of FDIA (Ahmed and Ullah 2018).
• Incorrect healthcare diagnosis: Many smart medical devices today contain sensors. 
Twisting sensor readings and thus injecting false data could lead to wrong diagnosis. 
Incorrect blood pressure reading or heart rate due to FDIA would lead to unwanted 
treatment and thus, the patient’s health could be seriously jeopardized.
• Illegal insurance claim: If a malicious entity falsely injects surgery data for which the 
associated expenditure would be covered by the insurance provider/company, then 
Fig. 4 Impacts of False Data Injection Attacks
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even without undergoing surgery, a patient can get paid or can claim payment. Hence, 
injection of such falsified healthcare records can force the insurance company to unnec-
essarily pay bills for illegitimate or incorrect data. Since most of the insurance providers 
are now using online portals to process these claims (in Fig. 5, a generic framework is 
shown for health insurance claims), it is much easier for the hackers to launch FDIA for 
quick monetary benefit.
According to an estimate by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), the total cost of 
insurance fraud (excluding health insurance) is more than USD $40 billion per year (“Back-
ground on: insurance fraud” 2019). If healthcare related insurance fraud is added, the 
amount would be huge! Checking the FBI’s Financial Crimes Report (2010), we find that 
the most prevalent types of healthcare fraud are billing for services not rendered. In these 
cases, there are upcoded bills that are sent to the payer(s)—the provider submits a bill using 
a code that yields a higher payment than for the service or medical item that was actually 
used. It may also include filing duplicate claims and unbundling, which means billing in a 
fragmented fashion for tests or procedures that need to be billed together at reduced cost. 
Excessive and unnecessary services may also be performed to increase the bill.
• Mission critical factors: During a complicated surgery, the surgeons heavily depend on 
the data such as blood pressure, pulse, heart rate, body temperature, etc. shown on the 
devices attached to the patient. Any minuscule variation of these data by the hackers 
may cause loss of life. High value targets like national leaders, influencers, politicians, 
activists, scholars, and so on can be victims of assassination by such injection of false 
data. When we talk about Internet-based or e-Healthcare or remote surgery or such 
CAS (using cyberspace) with some futuristic vision, FDIA cannot be ruled out anyway.
• Wrong credit analysis: A loan application can be mistreated if the credit score of the 
applicant is manipulated by the hackers. Bank will be misled, and the applicant will be 
the victim of FDIA.
• Medical imaging: Huge amount of medical imaging data can be generated in modern 
healthcare facilities. As an example, the dental scan helps the dentists understand the 
position of any anomalous wisdom tooth. If the hacker changes the image, both the 
dentist and patient will face unexpected outcome (Ahmed 2019). Likewise, for detection 
of cancerous lumps and accurate medical surgery, false image or distorted image could 
really threaten the patient’s life.
• Defense operations: In military operations, drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
are frequently used for reconnaissance and taking out targets. However, if these drones 
are hacked by FDIA, the drone user party will get bogus intelligence and it might cause 
serious irreparable damage. In fact, sensors are heavily involved in the data collection 
process in many applications that use drones. False sensor values can lead to false intel-
ligence leading to catastrophic military decisions.
Fig. 5 Online insurance claim processing system (generic flow)
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• Misleading academic portfolio: A hacker can manipulate the grades or academic his-
tory of students and the forged academic portfolio could create chaos in both aca-
demic institutions and in the employers’ organizations. An example of such case was 
shown in a famous television serial, ‘Suits’.
• Governance manipulation: Recent cyber(s) attack on Australian parliament (Pack-
ham 2019) is an eye opener to renew the interests in cybersecurity, especially focus-
ing on FDIA. A successful FDIA may have serious consequence both on national and 
international scale. Especially, in terms of foreign affairs, things might get worse.
There could be other critical scenarios where FDIA’s harm could be severe or even life-
threatening. Hence, a better understanding is required about FDIA and it is required to 
develop efficient countermeasures. Awareness about this kind of attack is the necessity 
of time.
Methods and countermeasures to defend against FDIA
In this section, we talk about some of the recently proposed FDIA countermeasures 
(Ahmed and Ullah 2018; He et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2014; Chaojun et al. 2015). The coun-
termeasures are developed mainly for smart grid applications; however, with little 
efforts, they can be adapted for other domains.
Key methods for various countermeasures
Key methods/models used for developing countermeasures in this domain are men-
tioned here:
• Deep learning (Ahmed and Islam 2020) is utilized to learn the FDIA characteristics 
from the historical data and the learned features are used to identify FDIA. The pro-
posed convolutional deep belief network can detect unobserved FDIA in real-time 
by exploring the temporal behaviors (Ahmed and Ullah 2018; He et al. 2017).
• Kullback-leibler distance (KLD) is exploited to distinguish between normal measure-
ments and false data injected measurements. Larger KLD reflects variation in prob-
ability distributions of the measurements from historical data (Chaojun et al. 2015).
• Sparse optimization is considered to be a solution for FDIA detection. To iden-
tify such an attack, the combination of a nuclear norm minimization and low rank 
matrix factorization can be used (Liu et al. 2014). The nuclear norm minimization 
is usually used for approximation of the matrix rank by shrinking all singular val-
ues equally. The computation operations for singular value decomposition would 
become quite expensive when matrix size and rank increase. Low rank matrix fac-
torization approach can help improve the scalability and solve large-scale problems 
of malicious attacks detection.
• Colored gaussian noise is used to create a model with autoregressive process for 
fighting FDIA (Tang et  al. 2016). This model estimates the state of power trans-
mission networks and develops a Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) to 
identify any such attack.
• Spatio-temporal correlations among the smart grid components are counted as a 
metric to identify FDIA in real time (Chaojun et al. 2015). To evaluate the integ-
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rity of state estimations, the spatio-temporal correlations for cyber state and trust-
based voting are given priority.
• Hop-by-Hop authentication schemes are developed as part of the FDIA counter-
measure (Zhu et al. 2007). When the number of compromised nodes exceeds a pre-
defined threshold, the base station should be able to identify the presence of FDIA. 
These schemes facilitate an optimized approach to identify and neutralize FDIA.
• Time-invariant gaussian control system is a linear FDIA identification method. 
Since the FDIA can create instability in the smart grid environment by bypassing 
the detection mechanism, the time-invariant Gaussian method is quite helpful in 
terms of identifying such stealthy cyber attacks (Mo and Sinopoli 2010).
• Incomplete information is considered to be an identifying characteristic of FDIA 
(Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad 2012). The mathematical model can reflect the 
characteristics of FDIA with incomplete information and a metric for vulnerabil-
ity measurement can rank different power grid topologies. Thus, the FDIA with 
incomplete information can be identified using the combination of mathematical 
model and vulnerability metric.
• Kalman filter can also be an effective method to detect FDIA (Manandharet al. 
2014). The experimental study shows that the usage of Euclidean distance metric 
with Kalman filter helps identify FDIA better than many other metrics.
• Public key cryptography is another useful solution to identify FDIA (Shen 2016; 
Azad and Pathan2014). Among different public key cryptography algorithms, 
McEliece public key system can guard the integrity of the smart grid data meas-
urements and nullify the impact of FDIA. However, the usage of such crypto-
graphic algorithm comes with some computational complexity.
• Blockchain (Ahmed 2019; Ahmed and Pathan 2020) has been recently used to cre-
ate a shield and protect the data authenticity. It is shown that the use of blockchain 
based security framework can safeguard the healthcare images from false image 
injection attacks. Due to the decentralized nature, cryptographic authentication 
and consensus mechanisms, in many cases, blockchain based security frameworks 
can fight back the FDIAs better than any other techniques.
Lack of benchmark datasets
To evaluate the effectiveness of the FDIA countermeasures, it is essential to have 
some benchmark datasets. The notion of cyber attacks is expressed by different types 
of anomalies in the publicly available datasets. There are three major types of anoma-
lies (Ahmed et al. 2015), namely,
• Rare (“when a particular data instance deviates from the normal pattern of the 
dataset”,
• Collective (“when a collection of similar data instances behaves anomalously with 
respect to the entire dataset”), and.
• Contextual (“when a data instance behaves anomalously in a particular context”).
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The characteristics of FDIA match closely with the contextual anomalies as these are 
based on a particular condition that once the network is compromised, the attacker 
manipulates the data. The contextual anomaly is defined in (Ahmed et  al. 2015) from 
network anomaly perspective and mapped with Probe attacks. Interestingly, these types 
of attacks are only available in DARPA/KDD Cup 1999 datasets which are sometimes 
heavily criticized by research community for being ‘outdated’. Among the rest of the 
publicly available network traffic analysis datasets, the notion of FDIA is largely miss-
ing. Without benchmark datasets and having only smart grid-based datasets (which 
are not always available), the evaluation of the FDIA countermeasures becomes more 
complicated. Table 2 reflects the attacks available in the benchmark network traffic data-
sets (Ahmed et al. 2015), used in cybersecurity research domain. This reveals the lack of 
datasets required for FDIA mitigation approaches.
Proposed new evaluation metrics for FDIA countermeasures
FDIA countermeasures cannot adopt the existing evaluation metrics used in network 
anomaly detection as the nature of the attack is significantly different than the regu-
lar attacks. Instead of attacking in the sense of active trial to disrupt the system, data is 
falsely used within the given system or regular operation to cause problem in the actual 
calculation or measurement. Hence, we find the regular attack and this kind of attack 
(i.e., FDIA) do not get the same platform when compared. To clarify here for the gen-
eral readers, the ‘metrics’ are basically measures of quantitative assessment that could be 
commonly used for performance assessment, comparison, and tracking of a system.
Ideally, the datasets used for network anomaly detection are labelled as ‘normal’ and 
‘attack’ traffic instances. Based on the discussion in the earlier sections, it is essential 
that newer and more accurate evaluation metrics need to be devised for FDIA coun-
termeasures. The existing metrics such as True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate 
(FPR), and F-measure, etc. can rather be adapted as a secondary set for evaluation of 
FDIA countermeasures. Therefore, in this section, we propose three new evaluation 
Table 2 Different types of  anomalous instances in  benchmark datasets [adopted from 
(Ahmed 2019)]
Dataset Rare Collective Contextual
KDD Cup 1999 ✔ ✔ ✔
UNSW‑NB15 ✔ ✔ ✖
TCP ✔ ✖ ✖
BNT ✔ ✖ ✖
ISCX ✔ ✖ ✖
Kyoto ✔ ✖ ✖
Moore ✔ ✖ ✖
WTP ✔ ✖ ✖
MI ✔ ✖ ✖
MO ✔ ✖ ✖
SI ✔ ✖ ✖
SO ✔ ✖ ✖
Sim1 ✔ ✖ ✖
Sim2 ✔ ✖ ✖
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metrics which will be useful to investigate the effectiveness of the existing and future 
countermeasures (with more accuracy).
• Metric 1—Vulnerability Identification (VI): This metric refers to vulnerabilities by 
which the attacker gains access to the system or network to inject false data. For 
example, there might be multiple vulnerabilities, by exploiting which, the attacker 
gains illegal access as a case shown in Fig.  3. A robust countermeasure for FDIA 
should be able to identify these vulnerabilities. Therefore, this metric will judge the 
credibility of such approaches. It can be mathematically represented as Eq. (2), where 
VI stands for Vulnerability Identification, DV stands for Detected Vulnerability, and 
TV reflects the Total number of Vulnerabilities to compromise the system or net-
work to gain access. Therefore, the higher the value of VI, the better the FDIA coun-
termeasure; e.g., if there are three vulnerabilities exploited to gain illegal access and 
the FDIA countermeasure detected only 1, then it should be reflected on the metric 
( VI = 1/3 ) and thus, can be compared with other countermeasures.
Although, it might seem to be very simple in terms of representation, in reality, this met-
ric is going to be very effective to provide meaningful insights to the Security Operations 
Centre (SOC) personnel. An ideal FDIA countermeasure should be able to dig deeper 
into the attacks and provide threat intelligence on the root-cause. The FDIA counter-
measures should have vulnerability scanning as an essential part and that should provide 
intelligence on the type of vulnerabilities exploited to launch FDIA. For instance, if the 
FDIA is launched exploiting multiple vulnerabilities such as Missing data encryption, 
OS (Operating System) command injection and SQL injection, the countermeasure’s 
built-in scanner identifies only SQL injection, then the effectiveness of the FDIA coun-
termeasure can be evaluated using the metric proposed. In this case, the metric VI will 
provide a score which can be used to compare the FDIA countermeasures. It would be 
much easier for the research community to develop the FDIA countermeasures if the 
metrics are well defined. Since, it is a very niche area of cyber security, it is important 
to disseminate the metric to encourage more researchers to focus on this issue which is 
far from trivial and can have dangerous repercussions as discussed in Section “Related 
work, concept, and impact of FDIA”.
• Metric 2—impact identification (II): This metric refers to the ability of FDIA coun-
termeasure to identify/estimate (as accurately as possible) the impacts caused by 
cyber criminals. For example, if the hacker injects false data into a database, the 
amount of false data needs to be identified. If the hacker injects three false records 
into a patient’s record database or manipulates the data for three patients, the met-
ric should be able to reflect the impact of FDIA. This metric can be expressed as 
in Eq. (3), where II refers to Impact Identification, DI stands for Detected Impact, 
and TI stands for Total Impact. Here, in the example of patient record(s), if the 
FDIA countermeasure approach identifies 2 out of 3 records being impacted, then 
( II = 2/3 ). Again, the higher the value of II, the better the approach.
(2)VI =
DV
TV
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Figures 6 and 7 reflect the concept behind this metric, II. In Fig. 6, the authentic records 
are stored and in Fig. 7, the solid-filled cells show the impact of FDIA. For example, after 
a successful FDIA launch, the hacker injected wrong data into the database, i.e., patient 
with ID4 now would be treated as HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) positive, the 
patient with ID6 would have a change in age and the blood-group of patient with ID9 is 
changed from O + to O−. In this context, an effective FDIA countermeasure is expected 
to identify all these falsely injected data values and hence, we need to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the FDIA countermeasures. For the given example in Figs. 6 and 7, a perfect 
FDIA countermeasure should have a perfect score of 1, if all the false data are identified 
by the countermeasure. Therefore, the metric II should be helpful in comparing different 
techniques associated with FDIA.
• Metric 3—data imputation (DIm): One of the expected characteristics of FDIA 
countermeasures is data imputation. Statistically, imputation is the process of 
replacing missing data with substituted value. In the context of FDIA, data impu-
tation metric will reflect the ability of the countermeasures to replace the false 
data with the original data. This metric can be expressed as in Eq. (4), where RD 
stands for Restored Data, and TI is Total Impact. For instance, considering Figs. 6 
and 7, if all the injected data, i.e., age, blood group and HIV are replaced by the 
(3)II = DI
TI
Fig. 6 A sample of patient records
Fig. 7 A sample of patient records under FDIA
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original data, then the FDIA would be considered to have a perfect score of 1. 
The DIm of the FDIA countermeasure would be also 1 ( DIm = 3/3 ), which is the 
highest score and it reflects how effective the approach is. Therefore, the metric 
reflects the essential functionality needed by the FDIA countermeasures.
The above discussion on the proposed metrics allows us to reconsider the strategies to 
develop robust countermeasures for fighting FDIA. Long story short, it is essential that 
all FDIA countermeasures should be able to:
• Identify the vulnerabilities by exploiting which hackers launched FDIA.
• Identify the injected false data.
• Replace the false data with the authentic data.
Conclusions
This article presents the case of the false data injection attack. Given today’s entan-
gled Internet and its various types of applications and users, any networked envi-
ronment or complex adaptive system could be targeted by FDIA. Hence, we have 
summarized the existing approaches for FDIA countermeasures for the awareness of 
the general readers and technology enthusiasts. Though in general, false data could 
be injected into various cases, FDIA specifically considers the deliberate attempts of 
modifying the data from various readings of sensors and devices or in the databases 
which could have long lasting impact even if the datasets are used later for any prac-
tical application. The change in data value could be apparently minor and there may 
not be a consistent attack flow in such case. In the long run, such an attack can have 
devastating effect on the system’s expected operation.
We hope that the researchers working in this field would get benefited by the newly 
proposed metrics and the insights presented in this article. This is still a growing field 
and in future, more advanced FDIA countermeasures can be assessed based on the 
metrics proposed in this work.
Abbreviations
DI: Detected impact; DIm: Data imputation; DoS: Denial of service; DV: Detected vulnerability; FDIA: False data injection 
attack; FPR: False positive rate; II: Impact identification; KLD: Kullback–Leibler distance; RD: Restored data; TI: Total impact; 
TPR: True positive rate; TV: Total number of vulnerabilities; UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles.
Acknowledgements
We sincerely thank the Editor‑in‑Chief for offering “Invited editorial waiver by the Editor in Chief”. We thank the reviewers for 
their insightful comments that helped us improve this article.
Authors’ contributions
All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Funding
No funding was specifically available for this work.
Availability of data and materials
All data and materials are our own. Data sharing is not applicable for this article.
(4)DIm = RD
TI
Page 14 of 14Ahmed and Pathan  Complex Adapt Syst Model             (2020) 8:4 
Competing interests
There is no competing interest to publish this work in this journal.
Author details
1 Academic Centre of Cyber Security Excellence, School of Science, Edith Cowan University, Joondalup, Australia. 
2 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Independent University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Received: 14 January 2020   Accepted: 10 April 2020
References
Ahamad SS, Pathan A‑SK (2019) Trusted service manager (TSM) based privacy preserving and secure mobile commerce 
framework with formal verification. Complex Adaptive Syst Model 7:3
Ahmed M (2019a) Data summarization: a survey. Knowl Inf Syst 58(2):249–273
Ahmed M (2019b) False image injection prevention using iChain. Appl Sci 9(20):4328. https ://doi.org/10.3390/app92 
04328 
Ahmed M, Islam AKMN (2020) Deep learning: hope or hype. Anna Data Sci, SpringerLink
Ahmed M, Pathan A‑SK (2020) The Blockchain: can it be trusted? IEEE Comput 53(4):31–35
Ahmed M, Ullah ASSMB (2018) “False data injection attacks in healthcare,” Australasian conference on data mining 
(AusDM 2017), data mining, communications in computer and information science book series (CCIS, volume 845), 
SpringerLink. p 192–202
Ahmed M, Mahmood A, Hu J (2015) A survey of network anomaly detection techniques. J Netw Comput Appl 60:19–31
Azad S, Pathan A‑SK (2014) “Practical Cryptography: Algorithms and Implementations using C ++”, ISBN: 978‑1‑48‑
222889‑2, CRC Press. Taylor & Francis Group, USA
Background on: insurance fraud, (2019) insurance information institute, https ://www.iii.org/artic le/backg round ‑on‑insur 
ance‑fraud Accessed 19 Feb 2020
Chaojun G, Jirutitijaroen P, Motani M (2015) Detecting false data injection attacks in ac state estimation. IEEE Transact 
Smart Grid 6(5):2476–2483
Cyber Security Breaches Survey (2019) Department for digital, culture, media and sport, the business continuity institute 
(BCI), https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/81359 9/
Cyber _Secur ity_Breac hes_Surve y_2019_‑_Main_Repor t.pdfAccessed 11 Jan 2020
Deng R, Xiao G, Lu R, Liang H, Vasilakos AV (2017) False data injection on state estimation in power systems attacks, 
impacts, and defense: a survey. IEEE Trans Industr Inf 13(2):411–423
Financial Crimes Report (2010–2011) FBI, USA, https ://www.fbi.gov/file‑repos itory /stats ‑servi ces‑publi catio ns‑finan cial‑
crime s‑repor t‑2010‑2011‑finan cial‑crime s‑repor t‑2010‑2011.pdf/viewAccessed 19 Feb 2020
He Y, Mendis GJ, Wei J (2017) Real‑time detection of false data injection attacks in smart grid: a deep learning‑based intel‑
ligent mechanism. IEEE Trans Smart Grid 8(5):2505–2516
Liang G, Zhao J, Luo F, Weller SR, Dong ZY (2017) A review of false data injection attacks against modern power systems. 
IEEE Trans Smart Grid. 8(4):1630–1638
Liu L, Esmalifalak M, Ding Q, Emesih VA, Han Z (2014) Detecting false data injection attacks on power grid by sparse 
optimization. IEEE Trans Smart Grid 5(2):612–621
Manandhar K, Cao X, Hu F, Liu Y (2014) Combating false data injection attacks in smart grid using kalman filter, In: IEEE 
ICNC. p 16–20
Mo Y, Sinopoli B (2010) False data injection attacks in control systems, In: first workshop on secure control systems, CPS 
week. 226–231
Packham C (2019) Exclusive: Australia concluded China was behind hack on parliament, political parties–sources, Reuters. 
https ://www.reute rs.com/artic le/us‑austr alia‑china ‑cyber ‑exclu sive/exclu sive‑austr alia‑concl uded‑china ‑was‑behin 
d‑hack‑on‑parli ament ‑polit ical‑parti es‑sourc es‑idUSK BN1W0 0VFAccessed 11 Jan 2020
Rahman MA, Venayagamoorthy GK (2018) A survey on the effects of false data injection attack on energy market,” in: 
2018 Clemson University Power Systems Conference (PSC), p. 1–6
Rahman MA, Mohsenian‑Rad H (2012) False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power 
grids, In: 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM); p. 3153–3158
Abdallah A, Shen, XS (2016) Efficient prevention technique for false data injection attack in smart grid, In: 2016 IEEE 
International Conference on Communications (ICC), p. 1‑6.
Shojafar M, Sookhak M (2020) Internet of everything, networks, applications, and computing systems (IoENACS). Int J 
Comput Appl 42(3):213–215
Tang B, Yan J, Kay S, He H (2016) “Detection of false data injection attacks in smart grid under colored Gaussian noise,” In: 
2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS); p 172–179.
Wang D, Guan X, Liu T, Gu Y, Sun Y, Liu Y (2013) A survey on bad data injection attack in smart grid,” In: 2013 IEEE PES asia‑
pacific power and energy engineering conference (APPEEC), pp. 1–6
Wang Q, Tai W, Tang Y, Ni M (2019) Review of the false data injection attack against the cyber‑physical power system. IET 
Cyber‑Phys Syst 4(2):101–107
Zhu S, Setia S, Jajodia S, Ning P (2007) Interleaved hop‑by‑hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sen‑
sor networks. ACM Trans Sen Netw. https ://doi.org/10.1145/12670 60.12670 62
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
